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 The papers you are about to read in this issue of the New York Law School Law 
Review are part of a birthday celebration. All of these papers—and many more—
were presented at a conference in the fall of 2010 that celebrated the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the Clinical Theory Workshops.1
 How should one celebrate the birthday of a workshop series? The natural answer: 
with workshops. To do that meant asking a lot of many people. Authors were asked 
to draft their papers not by the eve of the workshop, but months in advance. Members 
of a planning committee generously gave their time to thinking about how the 
conference should run, and many of them also read and commented on the authors’ 
drafts.2 Last but not least, conference registrants were asked to pick the workshops 
they planned to attend, and to read the papers for those workshops in advance, and 
around 200 people attended in all.
 The conference had a theme: “Twenty-Five Years of Clinical Scholarship: What 
Have We Learned, and What Should We Work On Next?” That’s a very broad 
theme, and rightly so. The concerns of clinical scholarship are broad, ranging from 
understanding effective lawyering and learning how to teach lawyering skills well, to 
shaping the role of clinical and skills teaching—and teachers—in law schools, to 
studying the character of the legal system as illuminated by clinical practice and 
addressing the role of law schools in contributing to the pursuit of justice outside 
school walls.
 We have been meeting since 1985 to discuss these questions, first at Columbia 
Law School and, since 1992, at New York Law School. The deans at both schools 
were always supportive. Bruce Ackerman,3 who is not a clinician but is always a 
friend of thoughtful inquiry, joined me in sending out the invitation4 to the first 
session, and Tony Amsterdam was the first presenter.5 So we started well. But why 
did we last? I think the answer is partly that clinical scholarship was growing, and 
clinical scholars needed opportunities to present their work and engage with their 
peers’ comments and critiques. We provided one such opportunity (and, happily, 
there have always been others, too). But there is a more personal answer as well: the 
group of teachers and scholars who became the regular participants in the workshop 
evolved our own culture of supportive and constructive—and critical—engagement 
that made the workshops a forum for “serious fun.” Usually meeting six times each 
1. For the conference schedule, see Clinical Theory Workshop 25th Anniversary Conference, New York Law 
School Law Review, http://www.nylslawreview.com/clinical-theory-workshop-papers/ (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2011).
2. The members of the planning committee were Claudia Angelos, Sameer Ashar, Susan Bryant, Stacy 
Caplow, Elizabeth Cooper, Lawrence Grosberg, Randy Hertz, Minna Kotkin, Richard Marsico, Vanessa 
Merton, David Reiss, Jonathan Romberg, Barbara Schatz, Jane Spinak, Ian Weinstein, and me. 
3. Bruce Ackerman, then on the Columbia Law School faculty, is now Sterling Professor of Law and 
Political Science at Yale Law School.
4. Author’s personal recollection.
5. Anthony Amsterdam, University Professor at New York University School of Law, has (among many 
other accomplishments) for many years been one of the leading scholars and teachers in the field of 
lawyering.
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academic year, we have had approximately 150 workshops and the chance to read 
work of many of the outstanding clinical scholars of the nation.6 I have had the 
pleasure of chairing the workshops through these years (with help from colleagues 
who took over when I was absent, or when I was presenting my own work). It has 
been a true privilege, really a delight.
 Now you have before you twelve of the papers from this conference. They provide 
twelve—at least twelve—answers to the conference questions of what we have 
learned, and what we should study next. The sheer range of the issues these papers 
address and the bodies of scholarship they engage attest to how far clinical scholarship 
has come. If there were ever simple and uncontested assumptions about what the 
work of clinical and skills teaching in law schools consisted of, they have long since 
ceased to be assumptions; they have become, instead, the starting points for critical 
examination, elaboration, and reconceptualization.
 Nevertheless, these insightful papers continue our pursuit of the issues that 
clinical scholarship has long explored. In particular, they explore the elements of 
good lawyering; the ways to help students learn about those elements; and the duties, 
pedagogical and otherwise, of law schools. In the following pages I will try to reflect 
part of what makes these papers so interesting—but I will not try to capture all of 
the insights that they offer: for that, I urge you to read the papers themselves!
i. thE ELEMEnts Of gOOd LaWYEring
 What is “good lawyering”? Even the meaning of this question is debatable—and 
so are the answers. These papers help us to understand what the question is really 
about, and point towards some of the answers.
 As to the question: it might be taken to ask what the elements of effective 
lawyering are. So, for instance, if one method of cross-examination is more likely to 
cast legitimate doubt on a witness’s testimony than another, then it is more effective. 
It is difficult to conceive of skills teaching that does not seek to teach, or at least lay 
the groundwork for, effective lawyering techniques; but it is far from clear that 
effectiveness is all we should teach. The natural question, after all, is “effective for 
what”? “Good lawyering” might also be understood as “lawyering for good,” and 
then the question might be understood to ask what kind of lawyering best promotes 
justice, in individual cases or in society as a whole.
 Still, preparing students for effective practice is surely one goal of clinical teaching—
but attaining it is not so simple. In one way or another, almost all of the papers here are 
concerned with how to reach this goal. At the risk of painful oversimplification, 
however, I want to highlight several papers that focus on relatively traditional skills of 
lawyering—trial practice, document drafting, and negotiation—and separately discuss 
several that address less familiar conceptions of what lawyers do.
6. For a list of the workshops from the beginning in 1985, see The Clinical Theory Workshops, New York 
Law School, http://www.nyls.edu/faculty/faculty_sponsored_projects/the_clinical_theory_workshops 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
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 A. (Seemingly) Traditional Skills
 Three of the papers published here, by Peter Hoffman, Robert Statchen, and 
Robert Condlin, look directly at traditional lawyering skills—and in doing so 
demonstrate the complexity of seeking to identify and teach effective traditional 
lawyering.
 Peter Toll Hoffman, in his article Law Schools and the Changing Face of Practice, 
“argues that legal education today is readying students for a legal practice that is fading 
away or no longer exists, thus failing to prepare students for the type of practice they 
will confront upon graduation.”7 This is a startling finding. After all, as Professor 
Hoffman carefully recounts, clinical and skills education has spread throughout 
America’s law schools.8 As Hoffman writes, “clinical and skills classes . . . . were in 
their infancy in 1970, and today they have become a vibrant and important part of a 
law school education.”9 It is no exaggeration to say that all the articles in this issue are 
the result of that profound change in legal education, and that the range and nuance 
of the ideas these articles develop is equally the result of this development.
 But the landscape of law practice has altered too. It seems that law schools have 
repeatedly found themselves a long step behind the practice world for which they 
seek to prepare their students. Hoffman observes that beginning in the 1970s, while 
“[t]he focus of [litigation] practice had shifted to the pretrial stage, . . . the law schools 
were producing graduates who were now able to try cases, but few of whom had 
learned anything about discovery or motion practice.”10 Then, as the 1980s and 1990s 
“witnessed a rise in the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, 
particularly mediation and arbitration, . . . . the law schools were busily introducing 
pre-trial litigation courses.”11 Even today, he writes, “only a few schools offer courses 
on mediation advocacy or how to represent clients in mediation.”12
 Part of the reason, surely, is that practice has changed a lot, and it is simply hard 
for law schools to keep up. Hoffman cites many changes in the world of practice, 
including the “vanishing trial”13 and the rise in alternative dispute resolution already 
noted, the growing centrality of depositions, and a host of “new technologies” from 
case management software to focus groups, all compounded by developments in 
popular culture.14 In all, he says, “[i]n my opinion, there has not been a comparable 
7. Peter Toll Hoffman, Law Schools and the Changing Face of Practice, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 203, 205 
(2011–12).
8. Id. at 208–15.
9. Id. at 209.
10. Id. at 207.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 208.
13. Id. at 216.
14. Id. at 215–19.
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time in the modern history of the legal profession when so many changes of such 
magnitude have affected the practice of law.”15
 Can law schools catch up? Hoffman outlines a set of substantial “barriers to 
improvement,” involving faculty experience and preferences, costs and other factors.16 
At the same time, he finds some reason for encouragement in law schools’ desire to 
attract students with curricular innovations, particularly those that might increase 
students’ chance of employment after law school, and he also emphasizes the pressure 
that external bodies such as the American Bar Association (the accreditor of law 
schools) can generate.17 Moreover, he observes, “[t]he speed at which clinical and 
skills courses have received acceptance within legal education has roughly equaled 
the rapidity with which the case method became the accepted mode of law school 
instruction . . . . support[ing] [the view] that clinical and skills courses are increasingly 
being viewed as fundamental.”18
 In the end, he writes that “[i]t should not be difficult for us, as legal educators, to 
remedy this problem, but it requires us to be aware of the existence of the problem and 
to take the necessary steps to bring our courses into the present to reflect how law is 
actually being practiced.”19 But it is striking that he also comments that “the authors 
of some (but hardly all) clinical and skills texts incorporate these changes [in legal 
practice] into their materials.”20 Now, it is possible that a comprehensive survey would 
show that many more clinicians have addressed these issues in their day-to-day 
teaching and in the practice norms they adopt in their clinics. But if even clinical and 
skills teachers are not entirely keeping up with developments in practice, why might 
that be? One possibility is that we ourselves have become somewhat academic, in the 
sense of being no longer completely engaged in the world outside academia. Another 
possibility, however, is that many clinicians do not see their principal teaching task as 
addressing the most current trends in practice. We will see, in other papers, alternative 
conceptions of what the central responsibilities of clinicians might be.
 If many traditional lawyering skills are evolving, however, some may be quite 
stable—and yet more complex than might meet the eye. No one doubts, for example, 
that effective document drafting is an important skill for many lawyers, perhaps 
above all in transactional practices. But what exactly is the skill of effective document 
drafting? This is one of the questions that Professor Robert Statchen takes up in his 
article Clinicians, Practitioners, and Scribes: Drafting Client Work Product in a Small 
15. Id. at 219.
16. Id. at 221–25 (capitalization omitted).
17. Id. at 225–30.
18. Id. at 229.
19. Id. at 231.
20. Id. at 230.
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Business Clinic.21 It is tempting to answer that the skill is the ability to take an issue 
and write up the appropriate document to handle it, from scratch. But this is not so.
 As Statchen writes, “[i]f students hope to become effective and efficient 
practitioners, they must get comfortable using forms.”22 Forms? Yes, certainly. The 
forms in books, and even more so the forms collected in a law office’s or a clinic’s 
files, represent accumulated wisdom in handling the various types of client matters 
they deal with. To reinvent that knowledge each time would likely be impossible, 
and would surely be perverse, because such a way of operating would give up on the 
possibility of learning from experience. At the same time, of course, the slavish 
copying of forms is bound to miss some aspect, or many aspects, of the present client’s 
situation and needs. The solution, however, is not to operate without forms. Statchen 
explains that “[s]tudents need to quickly learn that transactional practice is not a fill-
in-the-blanks exercise. Students need to understand that a significant part of the 
transactional lawyer’s craft is using forms efficiently. The craft involves tailoring the 
form to the specific needs of the client.”23
 So the drafting skill we need to teach is not, after all, simply the ability to start 
from scratch and produce the necessary document. In fact, occasions for that sort of 
drafting may be quite rare in practice—though of course the ability to write what 
needs writing is always important. The skill students will use more, however, is not 
writing on a blank slate but something else. Statchen continues:
Ultimately, this [tailoring work] can mean that for a certain document, a 
student may need to review five or six or more different forms, and then 
choose the best drafted. Furthermore, the student may need to take certain 
aspects of one form and combine that with certain aspects of another. In 
many ways, this drafting process is the nuts and bolts of transactional practice 
and likely one of the aspects critics say is missing from legal education.24
The skill to be taught, then, is a composite: diligence in researching available 
resources; judgment in selecting from them; and care, and careful writing, to adapt 
them to the client’s needs. The use of forms is not the second-class short-cut that 
replaces real writing in busy law firms; on the contrary, the wise use of forms is the 
first-class skill that practitioners need. (And in all of this, considerations of 
plagiarism—so much a concern in many law school teaching contexts—are irrelevant; 
the forms are meant to be copied, and copied without attribution.25)
 Teaching, moreover, must focus not on discouraging the use of forms but on 
helping students learn to use forms well; for that purpose, as Statchen discusses, 
teaching that is more directive than some models of clinical teaching prescribe may 
21. Robert R. Statchen, Clinicians, Practitioners, and Scribes: Drafting Client Work Product in a Small Business 
Clinic, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 233 (2011–12).
22. Id. at 263–64.
23. Id. at 264.
24. Id. at 264–65 (footnotes omitted).
25. Id. at 264 & n.154.
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well be needed.26 Professor Statchen goes on to discuss and illustrate the “small 
business clinic drafting process” he has developed.27 This process rests on a 
fundamental constraint: “[q]uite simply, the less time and resources students have to 
devote to preparing client work, the more defined structure and pre-prepared forms 
are necessary.”28 He recommends that “the professor and student collaboratively 
review and select an appropriate drafting method,”29 and emphasizes that “[e]fficiently 
and effectively selecting the appropriate form is part of the craft of being a 
transactional attorney. The clinical professor can guide the student through the 
process of finding the appropriate form to use as a starting point.”30 The sheer range 
of issues that may be relevant to a small business, moreover, counsels in favor of 
allocating the students’ time and creativity primarily to those matters of most concrete 
importance to the clients; other issues accordingly may best be handled by more 
reliance on pre-prepared forms or memoranda.31 Statchen presents these pedagogical 
approaches specifically as responses to the question of how to teach drafting, but the 
logic underlying them may point to reasons for us to carefully consider as well just 
how directive or nondirective the teaching of other clinical skills should be.
 It is striking how many familiar skills of lawyering we do not yet fully understand. 
Even when we know very well that some activity is integral to legal practice, it may 
not be easy to say what the most effective way to carry out that activity actually is. 
Robert Condlin addresses an aspect of this problem in his essay, Bargaining Without 
Law.32 He asks, essentially, what the core tasks of effective negotiation are. Professor 
Condlin maintains that argument about the application of law to the facts of the case 
is actually a critical element in effective dispute resolution negotiation, and that 
efforts to reconceptualize negotiation as less fundamentally conflictual are mistaken. 
From this premise he moves to a detailed delineation of the ways that lawyers can 
effectively argue about law, including such elements as “detail, multi-dimensionality, 
balance, subtlety, and emphasis”33 and, most fundamentally, “the ability to persist in 
the face of rejection, to push through an adversary’s dismissals, and continue to press 
one’s points until they have had their full effect.”34
 Condlin’s arguments are cogent, but there is of course an other side, and since 
that other side is not represented in this symposium, I do not want to suggest that 
the issue is concluded. I do want to emphasize two problems that Condlin himself 
26. Id. at 246–51. 
27. Id. at 259–78.
28. Id. at 259.
29. Id. at 262 (capitalization omitted).
30. Id. at 265.
31. Id. at 269–71 (discussing reasons for using an internal office memorandum on “choice-of-entity” 
questions).
32. Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining Without Law, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 281 (2011–12).
33. Id. at 313.
34. Id. at 317.
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highlights. First, he tells us that his description of how to argue effectively about law 
is meant to be descriptive, but that the kind of argument he believes is taking place 
in the world of practice is
not f lashy, theatrical, or even noteworthy. [Such argument] works its effects 
silently, without fanfare, and below the radar screen of people searching for 
advocacy techniques in dispute bargaining practice. Being invisible is one of 
its goals and one of the principal reasons it works as well as it does. But the 
consequence of invisibility is that there is no clear, quantifiable empirical data 
to support it. The best data comes from observation studies of actual 
bargaining practice, but they are in short supply, and the few that exist do not 
examine the issue directly.35
The point Condlin makes is not unique to negotiation. The truth is that there is a 
great deal we just do not know about how lawyers practice law, whether effectively or 
ineffectively. Much of what lawyers do—especially with the vanishing of the trial—
takes place outside of public view, often under strict rules of professional 
confidentiality. Perhaps because of that, perhaps because of the characteristic interests 
of legal scholars, perhaps because of the unavailability of the funding needed for 
scientific study, the interpersonal techniques of law practice have rarely been 
examined systematically. There are a great way scientific studies of medical 
interviewing—but far fewer of the interviewing work of lawyers.36 In short, we have 
a lot of work still to do.
 There is, however, a second problem, which Condlin also highlights. How can 
we argue about law, if law itself has no definite meaning? Yet some lawyers and law 
professors believe that the meaning of law is fundamentally indeterminate. Even 
lawyers not quite that skeptical no doubt believe that there is always something to be 
said on both sides of a dispute, and so the idea of arguing the law as a way to resolve 
a dispute seems paradoxical.37 Condlin is careful not to wade too far into these issues 
of jurisprudence, but he suggests two answers to this challenge. One is that lawyers 
do argue about law, that it is possible to argue more or less successfully, and that 
success will help win concessions in bargaining.38 Those are empirical claims, though 
as we have just seen they are not easy claims to test.
 Condlin’s other response is that arguing about legal entitlements is integral to 
the legitimacy of the legal system.39 If we do not argue law in resolving legal disputes, 
one might say, then we must admit that in the law, as Gertrude Stein said of Oakland, 
35. Id. at 311 n.85.
36. See Stephen Ellmann, Robert D. Dinerstein, Isabelle R. Gunning, Katherine R. Kruse & 
Ann C. Shalleck, Lawyers and Clients: Critical Issues in Interviewing and Counseling 
352, 377 n.20 (2009) (citing Linda F. Smith, Client-Lawyer Talk: Lessons from Other Disciplines, 13 
Clinical L. Rev. 505, 514 (2005–06) (“over 7000 titles considering the doctor-patient consultation”)). 
Professors Mansfield and Trubek make a similar, but broader point—that lawyers need to become 
evaluators and assessors of their work. See infra text accompanying notes 66–68.
37. Condlin, supra note 32, at 298–301.
38. Id. at 303–04, 322–23.
39. Id. at 304–06.
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“there is no there there.”40 But not everyone agrees that law is something distinctive, 
and some people—including some clinicians—would likely say that if law has an 
essence it is, in part, a deeply oppressive one. And for anyone holding these views, 
the question of whether there is a duty to “argue the law” seems to raise the most 
profound political objections. Those objections may or may not be well-founded—
but it seems unlikely we will ever fully resolve the issue of their validity, and so the 
question of whether we should argue the law as an integral part of dispute negotiation 
seems, inevitably, to be a matter for continued debate.
 B. New Conceptions of the Lawyer’s Role
 While it is both important and challenging to understand the elements of familiar 
lawyering skills—since they turn out to be less familiar when they are closely 
examined—clinicians have also paid close attention to defining new lawyering roles 
and the skills needed to perform them. Again, many of the papers in this issue 
address aspects of this concern, but I will focus here on three that particularly 
highlight these issues: the papers by Professors Brooks and Madden, Professors 
Mansfield and Trubek, and Professor Golden. These papers reflect the ferment in 
clinical thought and practice, as clinicians look for better ways to lawyer and offer 
their students the opportunity to take part in these new forms of practice.
 Let us begin with an area of competency that is by now so widely affirmed among 
clinicians that it might as justly be termed traditional as new: the principles of client-
centered practice. Most famously developed by David Binder, Susan Price, and their 
later co-authors, client-centeredness teaches that lawyers’ role is not to make 
fundamental decisions for their clients, or to push their clients into making the 
decisions the lawyers prefer.41 Instead, the task of the client-centered lawyer is to 
assist the client to make her own decision in the best way she can (and the lawyer’s 
job then is to help carry out that decision, of course within the limits of the law).42 To 
do so requires empathetic and careful interviewing, as well as counseling that 
thoroughly explores the options available to the client—but does not compel, or 
manipulate, the client’s ultimate choice among these options.
 It would be hard to find a clinician who did not agree with much of what client-
centeredness has to teach. But it is also clear that the ideal of client-centeredness, like 
most broad principles, can be understood in many different ways.43 It is equally clear 
that while clinicians generally affirm the importance of respect for clients, many 
have sought to understand the lawyer’s role and responsibilities as more affirmative 
40. Gertrude Stein, Everybody’s Autobiography 289 (Cooper Square 1971) (1937).
41. See David A. Binder et al., Lawyers as Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach 8–11 (2d 
ed. 2004). 
42. See id.; see also id. at 391 n.62 (discussing withdrawal from representation because of strong “moral 
disagreement”).
43. Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered Representation, 12 Clinical 
L. Rev. 369 (2005–06).
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and engaged than the most deferential accounts of the client-centered lawyer’s role 
with clients might suggest.
 This is the terrain that Susan Brooks and Robert Madden explore in their article 
Epistemology and Ethics in Relationship-Centered Legal Education and Practice.44 
Explicitly embracing, and seeking to build on, client-centered thinking, they describe 
their “Relationship-Centered Lawyering” (RCL) approach, which
builds upon and enhances the client-centered approach, as well as the 
Comprehensive Law movement approaches, by adopting a normative 
framework drawn principally from the mental health fields that focuses on 
understanding and relating to the client “in context.” RCL thus contemplates 
a narrative that goes beyond the legal controversy and includes the many 
people and systems with which the client interacts.45
A relationship-centered lawyer, as Brooks and Madden explain, is deeply concerned 
with her client’s situation, but is quite ready to intervene with a client to call to the 
client’s attention aspects of his personal context—the needs of his family, for instance, 
in a divorce—that he might otherwise be inclined to disregard.46
 Whether Brooks and Madden have found the right modulation between client 
choice and client context will no doubt be part of the ongoing debate among clinical 
scholars about such issues. What I want to focus on now, however, is the set of 
competencies they believe lawyers need in order to practice in this manner. Brooks 
and Madden summarize these competencies as falling in “three important and 
distinct areas: (1) substantive theory related to a contextualized understanding of 
human development; (2) principles of just and effective legal process; and (3) 
perspectives on affective and interpersonal competence, including cultural competence 
and emotional intelligence.”47 Each of these is a complex field, and only the second 
seems to intersect with traditional areas of lawyers’ expertise. But lawyers need such 
knowledge, the authors suggest, because without a “theoretical model from which to 
operate” they are ill-equipped to actually understand, as they should, the contexts of 
their clients’ lives.48
 Let us consider just the first of these three areas. What does it take to understand 
human development in context? The authors look to “[t]hree theoretical perspectives 
[that] provide the most up-to-date and useful research-based knowledge . . . : family 
systems theory, developmental theory, and attachment theory.”49 The value of this 
knowledge, as the authors explain, is not only that it supports intellectual 
understanding but that it shapes and supports appropriate ethical principles of lawyer-
44. Susan L. Brooks & Robert G. Madden, Epistemology and Ethics in Relationship-Centered Legal Education 
and Practice, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 331 (2011–12).
45. Id. at 342.
46. Id. at 351–52.
47. Id. at 342.
48. Id. at 343.
49. Id.
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client interaction. “The content of these theories directs lawyers to appreciate the 
importance of context, directs them to be non-judgmental, and to recognize and give 
voice to client strengths, autonomy, and dignity.”50 I do not take Brooks and Madden 
to suggest that lawyers must become experts in each of these areas. But for lawyers to 
become competent relationship-centered practitioners, as Brooks and Madden 
envision them, it seems clear that they must come to understand and be able to use 
these perspectives. Simply to achieve more fully the kind of respect for and fidelity to 
clients that clinicians have sought to help students achieve for many decades is, 
plainly, a demanding task.
 Brooks and Madden are well aware that their proposals are far-reaching, and 
they also speak to the educational approaches needed to implement them. Drawing 
on insights from neurobiology, they emphasize that “[r]ecognizing and integrating 
the data from feelings and emotions is a critical process in effective legal practice.”51 
Moreover, they point out that education embodies “professional acculturation,” and 
so the nature of that professional culture will affect—and has often blunted—
students’ ability to respond in this holistic way.52 In response, they endorse a number 
of strategies for “teaching ethical and professional conduct,”53 with a particular 
emphasis on the importance of fostering empathy and compassion as sources of 
“interpersonal responsibility and ethical behavior.”54 Ultimately, they recommend not 
only changes in the courses law schools offer but also changes in the culture of our 
schools: “we must endeavor in as many ways as possible to instill a culture of mutual 
support, collaboration, and community-building within our institutions that might 
be considered an implicit curriculum.”55
 But students, and lawyers, may need to change not only their orientation but also 
their concrete techniques for serving clients. Marsha Mansfield and Louise Trubek 
explicitly address issues of changing lawyer roles in their article, New Roles to Solve 
Old Problems: Lawyering for Ordinary People in Today’s Context.56 While they emphasize 
the “ justice gap” between the legal services that middle-class and poor people can 
afford and those they need, they also suggest that “available technology and new 
collaborations create opportunities for new roles and tools” that can narrow this 
gap.57 Like Peter Hoffman, Professors Mansfield and Trubek observe that “[l]aw 
school clinics, now the primary teachers of practice skills, are often embedded in 
50. Id. at 344.
51. Id. at 336.
52. Id. at 338–40.
53. Id. at 356–60.
54. Id. at 361.
55. Id. at 364.
56. Marsha M. Mansfield & Louise G. Trubek, New Roles to Solve Old Problems: Lawyering for Ordinary 
People in Today’s Context, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 367 (2011–12).
57. Id. at 368.
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routines that reflect earlier contexts.”58 They suggest that lawyers can respond to the 
terrible shortage of legal assistance for many people in this country by taking on 
three new roles: as collaborators, evaluators, and facilitators.
 Lawyers as “collaborators” can work with other professionals to provide a wide-
ranging response to client problems that generally are not just “legal,” but “typically 
occur in a broader context often involving a financial, medical, family or housing 
crisis.”59 There is obvious force to the idea that a multi-faceted problem needs a multi-
faceted solution. Indeed, even in settings where clients face no shortage of resources, 
there is growing recognition that the solutions they need (and will pay for) may 
require the expertise of a team rather than the virtuoso work of a single individual or 
a single profession.60
 What are the skills the lawyer-collaborator must master? It is not Mansfield & 
Trubek’s aim to provide a comprehensive listing of these skills, but their article offers 
important illustrations of what will be needed. One aspect, reflected in the authors’ 
description of the work of the University of Wisconsin’s Center for Patient 
Partnerships, is a change in focus: “[t]he lawyer becomes a part of the support system 
for the client in a manner very different from the traditional role of intervening when 
the client comes to the lawyer’s office for redress of a singular problem. The lawyer 
is part of the public health endeavor’s ongoing mission.”61 Lawyers performing this 
mission will need to learn to understand clients’ concerns comprehensively, and to 
assess strategies for their contribution to the overall well-being of their client. In one 
sense, these skills are not novel—theories of client-centered law practice already call 
for such efforts. But now, it would seem, the lawyer’s job will not be only to 
comprehensively understand the factors bearing on the client’s legal options and 
choices, but to focus directly on the full range of the client’s concerns, among which 
legal considerations may be quite subordinate.
 That is no small task. For lawyers to accomplish it, clearly a recognition of “the 
interdependent roles” of team members is important, and no doubt not just a 
theoretical recognition but an actual embodiment of an attitude of mutual respect. 
To collaborate is not the same as to command or to exploit. The lawyer is a “partner 
rather than [an] autonomous savior.”62 Though partnering is admirable, it is not 
always simple, and its component skills will be an important issue for law teachers 
and law students as collaborative work grows in prominence. As partners, moreover, 
lawyers and their colleagues must learn to “share information across institutional 
divides” so as to shape strategic approaches.63 And, although Mansfield and Trubek 
58. Id. at 384.
59. Id. at 372.
60. See William D. Henderson, Are We Selling Results or Résumés: The Underexplored Linkage Between Human 
Resource Strategies and Firm-Specific Capital 15–24 (Ind. Univ. Sch. of Law-Bloomington Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 105, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121238. 
61. Mansfield & Trubek, supra note 56, at 376.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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believe that the result of such collaboration is actually to enhance “[t]he lawyer’s 
autonomy and independence,”64 it seems fair to say that the nature of autonomy 
within a team must be somewhat different than the same quality in a solo situation—
and that therefore lawyers will need to work through important personal and perhaps 
ethical questions of independence as they enter into such teams.65
 Mansfield and Trubek suggest that lawyers can also play important roles as 
evaluators. As they write: “[t]he legal profession has historically paid scant attention 
to evaluating the effectiveness of its work. In this regard, lawyers lag behind other 
professions, particularly the health professions.”66 Again, there is obvious force to the 
idea that when legal services (and other needed assistance) are in short supply, we 
must be able to ask and answer the question of whether particular ways of deploying 
our available resources really work.67 But this too is not easy. “Assessments must be 
done with expertise, care, and ultimately, empirical validation . . . in order to justify 
need, value, and effectiveness.”68 Lawyers will need to acquire the necessary expertise 
in the methodology of assessment—or partner, in this respect as well, with other 
professionals who have that knowledge. Perhaps more important, they will need to 
adopt the habit of assessment. That habit likely involves an openness to the 
observations and opinions of others; a disposition to believe one’s own work can and 
should always be improved; and, fueling both of these, a humility about the extent of 
their own expertise that may not have always been typical of lawyers (or other 
professionals).
 The third of the new roles Mansfield and Trubek identify is the role of facilitator. 
They write that “[l]awyers can assume the role of strategic facilitators, bringing 
stakeholders together to seek solutions and also ensuring that all voices are heard.”69 
Here Mansfield and Trubek’s thinking intersects with the work of Robin Golden, and 
I will focus now on Golden’s article, Collaborative as Client: Lawyering for Effective 
Change, which explicates in detail a particular form of strategic facilitation.70
 Professor Golden sets her essay in the context of a wave of scholarly exploration 
of the possibility that lawyers can best contribute to social change by representing 
communities.71 Community representation can be a form of adversarial lawyering—
though undertaken on behalf of a community rather than an individual litigant. But 
Golden’s vision is different. Drawing on the experience of the Yale “Community and 
64. Id.
65. They will, for example, need to work through the complications that differing professional rules about 
confidentiality may pose for the information sharing that enables the team members to work together. 
66. Mansfield & Trubek, supra note 56, at 377 (footnotes omitted).
67. Id. at 378–79.
68. Id. at 379 (internal quotations omitted).
69. Id. at 381.
70. Robin S. Golden, Collaborative as Client: Lawyering for Effective Change, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 393 
(2011–12).
71. Id. at 394–95, 403–04.
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Economic Development” clinic to articulate “a new model of lawyering in support of 
collaborative effort,”72 she calls for lawyers to work on behalf of collaborative groups 
structured to include a wide range of stakeholders in a problem, not just “direct 
representatives of the affected community.”73 These members surely will have 
potentially conf licting interests, and they might not “naturally” come together. 
Golden emphasizes that “generally, the lawyer will be helping to develop the client by 
first encouraging the engagement of the participants in a collaborative process and, 
second, by managing the collaborative process to ensure that the ‘client’s’ interests 
are clear and being served.”74 Golden emphasizes that for parties to join the 
collaborative is largely to give up the possibility of resorting to litigation to resolve 
differences between them.75 Instead, the members come together to find a way to 
jointly address a problem, and the lawyer’s job is to sustain that process. Golden 
writes that “a lawyer’s obligation can be owed to the shared understanding of the 
problem itself. For this kind of advocacy, then, the members of the collaborative 
effort, as a group, are the client.”76
 Golden’s model suggests that what lawyers need is both a true change of direction, 
and a careful practice of the kinds of skills they have long been developing. The 
change in direction is from adversariness to a recognition “that solving complex 
problems requires compromise and mutual understanding that cannot be achieved 
through an emphasis on the advancement of individual interests.”77 The skills that 
lawyers need for this work, Golden suggests, call for lawyers to understand “group 
and intergroup theory from the field of organizational behavior, . . . . concepts of 
group formation, intergroup dynamics, and theories of representational groups[.]”78 
Expertise of this sort, then, must become a criterion of effectiveness—one quite 
distant from the elements of effectiveness in more traditional practices.
 At the same time, Golden urges lawyers to attend very carefully to a quite 
traditional concern: the precise definition of the client—here, the client group—and 
of the lawyer’s responsibilities to that group. Her sample “Memorandum of 
Understanding” between the clinic and the collaborative “Consortium” addresses the 
duties of the consortium members as part of the group; the voting rules to govern 
consortium decisionmaking; the limits on attorney-client confidentiality that the 
group structure entails; the members’ consent to the clinic withdrawing in the event 
of an irresoluble conflict of interest; and the specific objectives “to be undertaken 
during the period of engagement.”79 Golden makes clear that she believes that the 
72. Id. at 400.
73. Id. at 433.
74. Id. at 408–09.
75. Id. at 407 n.73.
76. Id. at 396 (footnotes omitted).
77. Id. at 401.
78. Id. at 404.
79. Id. at app. 
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process of formulating and memorializing this careful delineation of roles is itself an 
integral part of the representational project, “essential to both keep the potential 
domination of the lawyer in check, and also to ensure that the focus on the problem-
solving agenda is preserved.”80 Here, the lawyer to the collaborative is, like her more 
traditional counterparts, addressing familiar issues—of lawyer power, client consent, 
confidentiality, and conflicts of interest—though the resolution of these issues is 
shaped by the new context of the work.
 We are only beginning to understand the field that Golden explores, and Golden 
is well aware of the range of issues her work implicates. Should the lawyer’s objective 
be the support of collaboration among people with quite varying interests, or the 
empowerment of disadvantaged communities against their opponents?81 Should the 
collaborative be focused on a specific issue, or aim to be an ongoing presence in the 
community?82 Can lawyers officially, or unofficially, be the leaders of the collaboratives 
they have helped create?83 And if the point of the work is to assist in an ongoing 
process of collaboration, is it actually necessary for the lawyer to represent anyone as 
a “client?”84 The turn to new roles, in short, does not escape the complexities of the 
old ones—instead, it adds to them.
ii. thE WaYs tO hELp stUdEnts LEarn
 The more demanding the range of competencies that lawyers must acquire, the 
more acute becomes the question of how to help them do so. Accomplishing this 
teaching goal has been a central concern of clinicians (co-existing, certainly, with a 
widely shared desire to further a mission of social justice as well). Not surprisingly, 
many of the articles in this issue address aspects of teaching strategy. As the earlier 
part of this Introduction reflects, for example, Peter Hoffman’s central focus is on 
bringing our pedagogy in line with the realities of practice.85 Robert Condlin, though 
not explicitly focusing on pedagogy here, similarly hopes that legal academics seeking 
to describe dispute bargaining will “ join[] practical wisdom with social science 
research to the benefit of both.”86 I have already discussed Robert Statchen’s 
pedagogical approach to the skill of drafting, and the pedagogical recommendations 
Susan Brooks and Robert Madden urge for teaching “relationship-centered 
lawyering.”87 Professors Trubek and Mansfield also recommend “two major curricular 
reforms” to help students learn the new lawyering roles they envision: “holistic clinics 
80. Id. at 407.
81. See id. at 404–05.
82. See id. at 373 n.24, 417.
83. See id. at 413 & n.93.
84. See id. at 407, 404 n.52, 409 n.81. 
85. See supra text accompanying notes 7–20 (discussing Professor Hoffman’s article). 
86. Condlin, supra note 32, at 327.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 26–31 (discussing Professor Statchen’s pedagogy); supra text 
accompanying notes 51–55 (discussing the teaching recommendations of Professors Brooks and Madden).
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exploring new lawyering models,” and new courses and degrees that focus, particularly 
in partnership with other disciplines, on issues of social policy, research methodology 
and problem-solving roles.88 Similarly, Professor Golden, though focusing primarily 
on describing and making the case for the “collaborative problem-solving model” she 
advocates, notes that the reason she calls for this approach “in the clinic setting is to 
train practitioners to be nimble advocates[,]” a process that requires the students to 
“have both a grounding in theories of organizational dynamics and debriefing 
sessions in which the supervising attorney models the self-reflective stance that is 
required for this work to be successful.”89
 Five other articles in this issue share a concentration on teaching issues, and it is 
this aspect of these articles on which I will focus in the pages to come. These are the 
essays by Kathleen Kelly Janus and Dee Smythe; Peggy Cooper Davis, Ebony Coletu, 
Bonita London, and Wentao Yuan; Deborah Maranville, Mary Lynch, Susan Kay, 
Phyllis Goldfarb, and Russell Engler; Laurie Morin and Susan Waysdorf; and Brook 
Baker. Clinical pedagogy is an immense field, and these articles (and the others in 
this volume) naturally do not cover every aspect of it; however, as we will see, they 
illuminate many central elements of the work of preparing students for practice.
 A. Cultural Competency and the Role of Client-Service Work
 Kathleen Kelly Janus and Dee Smythe focus on the crucial skill of cultural 
competency in their article Navigating Culture in the Field: Cultural Competency Training 
Lessons from the International Human Rights Clinic, which focuses on the work that 
Stanford clinic students are doing with the Law, Race and Gender Research Unit 
(LRG) at the University of Cape Town in South Africa.90 “Since the development of 
the first international human rights clinic thirty years ago,” Janus and Smythe write, 
“clinicians have looked to human rights clinics, and particularly international fieldwork, 
as a way to advance clinical pedagogy and cross-cultural training.”91 The importance of 
“cross-cultural competency” has certainly been recognized across the clinical community 
over the past decades,92 though it seems likely that this competency remains a less 
familiar lawyering skill than, say, trial advocacy. Janus and Smythe see “the ability to 
effectively navigate culture [as] at the core of effective human rights advocacy,” and 
observe that “[i]nternational human rights clinics have been hailed as providing 
invaluable learning opportunities for students, not least because students are able to 
experience first hand the role that culture plays in our work as lawyers.”93
88. Mansfield & Trubek, supra note 56, at 386–90 (capitalization omitted). 
89. Golden, supra note 70, at 429.
90. Kathleen Kelly Janus & Dee Smythe, Navigating Culture in the Field: Cultural Competency Training 
Lessons from the International Human Rights Clinic, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 445 (2011–12).
91. Id. at 446 (footnote omitted).
92. See id. at 447–48; see, e.g., Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 
8 Clinical L. Rev. 33 (2001).
93. Janus & Smythe, supra note 90, at 452.
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 Certainly this makes sense. Travel is broadening, and travel to a very different 
society surely offers students the opportunity to encounter and come to understand a 
culture quite unlike their own. But it is not inevitable that students, or teachers, will 
respond this way. As Janus and Smythe make clear, a recurrent issue in international 
human rights work is the “risk that human rights lawyers will be perceived as ‘Western 
Imperialists’”94—displaying what we might understand broadly as the tendency of 
well-intentioned outsiders from rich and privileged societies to assume that they 
already know what the new people they are meeting need and should want. Closely 
linked to this danger is another, as Janus and Smythe remind us: the danger that 
advocates will essentialize those they seek to help as victims wholly unlike 
themselves—as, for instance, the “Exotic Other Female.”95 The question for clinical 
teachers, therefore, is how to forestall such thinkings since it not only blunts students’ 
learning but also risks impairing the actual human rights work being done.
 Perhaps the paradigmatic response of clinical teachers to such challenges over 
the years has been to create courses in which students undertake the representation 
of individual clients. The desire to faithfully serve a client for whom one is responsible 
is a powerful one, and students who come to see that they are doing a weaker job of 
representation because of their difficulties in understanding their clients’ cultural 
backgrounds have strong reason to reach for cultural competency.
 But international human rights clinical work, Janus and Smythe show, can build 
cultural competency by quite different paths. “[M]uch of our fieldwork did not 
involve individual client representation, but working with NGOs on larger-scale 
advocacy and the development of complex multi-layered cases for long-term impact 
litigation.”96 The authors’ description of the work of the University of Cape Town 
LRG, in which the clinic students are placed, reflects how much besides litigation 
this body undertakes:
LRG seeks to support the rights claims of women and other vulnerable people 
. . . . by way of a number of participatory processes, including documenting 
actual and changing social practices to use as evidence of “living law” in 
litigation and policy debates about customary law and women’s rights, holding 
regular workshops, and supporting rural communities to bring their concerns 
to the attention of decision makers.97
The result was that “the students’ project work was primarily research-oriented.”98 
This did not mean, however, that students had no occasion to stretch their own 
cultural understandings beyond a library’s walls:
94. Id. at 449.
95. Id. (citing Karen Engle, Female Subjects of Public International Law: Human Rights and the Exotic Other 
Female, 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 1509 (1992)).
96. Id. at 474.
97. Id. at 460.
98. Id. at 461.
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[M]ost students who worked on the project also had opportunities to obtain 
field experience. Such opportunities included visiting field sites in other 
provinces, observing strategy sessions relating to litigation of customary law 
matters, engaging with experts, preparing discussion documents for and 
briefing project partners, and seeking difficult to obtain information on 
pressing legal issues from government institutions.99
 The clinic worked in many ways to help students grasp the cultural issues this 
work presented. Janus and Smythe describe the reading and simulation training 
students undertake before going to South Africa100—and part of the value of this 
paper, and others in this issue, is precisely this fine-grained reporting of exactly how 
the clinic works, and moreover how its work has evolved as the faculty learned from 
their own experience over time.101 Janus and Smythe also point to the value of a 
program in which students are placed “in one of two deeply rural communities . . . 
for a week shortly after they arrive in South Africa. In both villages we partnered 
with local women’s groups, who host the students,” all of whom have “described this 
experience as very important in contextualizing their work at LRG.”102 Even so, 
students may find the lack of more client contact frustrating—but this very frustration, 
as Janus and Smythe say, can become the subject of cultural competency training 
focused on the differences between the expectations and needs of the students and 
those of the partner organizations in South Africa.103
 Over time, no doubt, Janus and Smythe will continue to modify these 
approaches—and that f lexibility is a central part of effective teaching. But the general 
point of their account is that even so personal a task as achieving cultural competency 
may be taught not only through client representation but also in quite different ways. 
If that is true for clinic students working in South Africa, it may be equally true, as 
Janus and Smythe suggest, for clinics here in the United States.104
 B. Skills Education and Student Well-Being
 Peggy Cooper Davis, Ebony Coletu, Bonita London, and Wenato Yuan address 
a teaching challenge that goes beyond imparting any particular skill. In their article, 
Making Law Students Healthy, Skillful, and Wise,105 they “suggest that the experience 
and well-structured critical analysis of real or simulated lawyers’ work is not only 
99. Id.
100. Id. at 456–59, 465–68.
101. See id. at 464–66 (describing the restructuring of the roles of U.S. and South Africa faculty in response 
to students’ ref lection on their experiences).
102. Id. at 461–62.
103. Id. at 476–77.
104. Id. at 478–79.
105. Peggy Cooper Davis, Ebony Coletu, Bonita London & Wentao Yuan, Making Law Students Healthy, 
Skillful, and Wise, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 487 (2011–12).
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necessary to professional excellence, but also important to the learning capacity and 
emotional health of developing lawyers.”106
 In principle, it seems unlikely that students whose emotional well-being is under 
siege are in the best position to learn. It also seems unlikely that students who emerge 
from law school with a sense of having lost their ideals, or their way, will f lourish in 
the practice of law. But, as Davis, Coletu, London, and Yuan remind us, “[t]he journey 
through law school is both stressful and correlated with increases in depression, 
anxiety, and substance abuse.”107 They attribute “[t]he notorious levels of stress and 
other kinds of psychological distress among law students” partly to the inescapable 
competition engendered by law school grading systems.108 They also suggest that law 
school generates a subtle devaluation of practical skills—in contrast to the academic 
skills measured by first-year classroom grades.109 In addition, they see challenges to 
students’ spirit and resulting achievement in “students’ and professors’ theories of 
mind,” that is, in the disabling effects of the idea that achievement is the result of a 
fixed intelligence rather than of “practice and effort.”110 They emphasize as well the 
impact of “social identity threat”—the “fear of confirming a negative stereotype about 
a group with which one is identified.”111
 What can be done about these complex and powerful pulls on our students? The 
authors analyze the New York University School of Law’s first-year course on 
lawyering as a “laboratory in which to unpack the causes of dysfunction and stress 
and a testing ground for new teaching strategies.”112 Describing the year-long, pass-
fail “sequence of practice experiences and structured reflection on those experiences” 
in the course, the authors write that “[t]he immediate goal is structured, carefully 
sequenced learning. The larger goal is building career-long habits of self-reflection 
for professional growth.”113 The course does not seek to abolish competition in law 
school, but to mitigate it, “by encouraging collaboration, emphasizing the malleability 
of lawyering skills, and highlighting relationships between theory and practice.”114 In 
a variety of ways, as the authors illustrate, the course seeks to introduce students to 
the tasks of lawyers and to fuel the students’ learning by both challenging and 
sustaining them as they progress.115
 But does it work? Mansfield and Trubek, as we have seen, point to the importance 
of lawyers’ role as evaluators, and Davis, Coletu, London, and Yuan embrace the 
106. Id. at 488.
107. Id. at 490.
108. Id. at 491.
109. Id. at 492–93.
110. Id. at 493–94.
111. Id. at 494.
112. Id. at 495.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 495–500.
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challenge of evaluating, or assessing, the actual impact of this thoughtfully designed 
course. The authors emphasize that their results are “preliminary,”116 but let us briefly 
consider certain striking—and also somewhat puzzling—findings.
 First, students who were asked over a six-week period, “[h]ow respected did you 
feel by your peers and professors in this course [this week]?” almost always reported 
feeling more respected in lawyering than in their other first-year courses (civil 
procedure, contracts, criminal law, and torts). But the differences were sometimes 
“only marginally significant” statistically, and the effect was not huge: in one week, 
for example, the respect score, on a 10-point scale, was 7.81 in lawyering, compared 
to a low of 6.83 in civil procedure.117
 Second, students usually felt that lawyering was more useful to them than any of 
their other courses.118 Here, however, “the differences between lawyering and the 
other courses were not always significant” statistically, while the absolute differences 
again appear to be clear but not huge.119
 These findings are valuable, and tantalizing. They suggest that the lawyering 
course speaks to students in some ways that other courses do not. At the same time, 
they suggest that the differences in students’ responses to lawyering and to their 
other classes are not as great as the substantial differences in course structure might 
have led us to predict. Do the results attest to the degree to which the atmosphere of 
the rest of law school permeates even a course designed as this one is? Or could they 
indicate that some part of the lessons of lawyering has made its way into the 
experience of students elsewhere in the curriculum? We do not yet know, and the 
authors “welcome opportunities to share [their] methodology and to test new versions 
at other schools.”120 Here, as elsewhere, there is much to be learned.
 C. Shaping a Curriculum for Experiential Learning, In and Out of School
 Three other papers in this issue also take up aspects of the overall question of 
how experiential learning should be offered to students. As we will see, these papers 
collectively identify a wide array of experiential course options—and suggest that 
possibly other options, outside of courses and even outside law school altogether, are 
valuable as well.
 Deborah Maranville, Mary Lynch, Susan Kay, Phyllis Goldfarb, and Russell 
Engler, in their essay Re-vision Quest: A Law School Guide to Designing Experiential 
Courses Involving Real Lawyering,121 begin from the proposition that the world of 
116. Id. at 503.
117. Id. at 509–10, 510 n.51.
118. Id. at 510–11.
119. Id. at 510.
120. Id. at 511.
121. Deborah Maranville, Mary A. Lynch, Susan L. Kay, Phyllis Goldfarb & Russell Engler, Re-vision 
Quest: A Law School Guide to Designing Experiential Courses Involving Real Lawyering, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. 
Rev. 517 (2011–12).
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such courses has grown beyond its two most familiar categories: “externship 
placements and in-house clinics.”122 They trace the broad course of the evolution of 
clinical teaching in this country, and observe that such issues as the tensions between 
public service and student education, and between in-house and externship teaching, 
have shaped “today’s varied landscape in which competing interests and realities have 
generated an array of different clinical models and forms.”123 And they conclude, 
after looking to the important critiques of legal education in the recent Carnegie 
Report,124 the Best Practices volume,125 and the MacCrate Report,126 that:
This literature suggests a pedagogy in which students assume the role of the 
lawyer, and while in role, face the sort of problems that lawyers encounter in 
practice. The students’ performance in these roles becomes the subject of 
study and, consequently, students are asked to make their thinking, planning, 
and choosing systematic and explicit, in oral and written form, at every step 
along the way. Students are asked to consider the significant events occurring 
in their casework, process them internally, seek to understand their meaning, 
and evaluate them in light of their own performance. Simply stated, we 
believe this is the ref lective, context-based education that best realizes the 
aims of the Carnegie Report and Best Practices and most responds to the 
public service needs of the times.127
 The question, then, is how to deliver this sort of education. This is a crucial 
question for law schools taking seriously the need to offer students opportunities of 
this sort, and the authors respond to this need by creating “a thoroughgoing list of 
the structural components for real lawyering experiences.”128 It is worth pausing here, 
however, to consider the meaning of the phrase “real lawyering experiences.” The 
authors’ focus on “real lawyering experiences” distinguishes their subject from pure 
simulation courses, though, as they observe, “the dividing line between simulation-
based courses and courses involving real experiences has also blurred over time.”129
 But what are “real lawyering experiences?” The authors’ definition “incorporates 
a wide range of roles that lawyers play, including some, such as mediation and 
legislative work, which can also be performed by non-lawyers.”130 This definition is 
both appropriately f lexible and somewhat ambiguous, and it seems fair to say that 
122. Id. at 518.
123. Id. at 524.
124. William M. Sullivan Et Al., Educating Lawyers (2007) [hereinafter “Carnegie Report”].
125. Roy Stuckey et al., Best Practices for Legal Education: A Vision and a Roadmap (2007) 
[hereinafter “Best Practices”].
126. Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Legal Education and 
Professional Development—An Educational Continuum: Report of The Task Force on 
Law Schools and the Profession (1992) [hereinafter “MacCrate Report”].
127. Maranville et al., supra note 121, at 525.
128. Id. at 526. 
129. Id. at 518 n.4.
130. Id. at n.5. 
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the term “real lawyering experiences” is indeed ambiguous in roughly the same way 
that the boundaries of the “unauthorized practice of law” are ambiguous: what 
lawyers do overlaps substantially with what other people in our society do. Some 
clinics may ref lect this ambiguity quite strikingly. For example, an international 
human rights clinic that concentrates on fact-finding missions leading to published 
reports is doing work that non-lawyers clearly might, and do, undertake. Students 
may also get experience that is both real and law-related in courses where they work 
on projects with real-world, legal significance—for example the creation of a website 
focused on a developing area of law—even though this work is a considerable distance 
from the work of a lawyer representing a client. Courses of this sort—which New 
York Law School, among others, has developed131—may mark a further extension of 
the authors’ typology.
 In any event, the authors themselves were surprised by how many possibilities 
their typology identified.132 Not all options are created equal, as the authors’ analysis 
makes clear, but they write that “[b]y displaying a broad menu of structural options, 
the typology holds the potential to expand our vision and help us make explicit the 
choices that are currently available to legal educators for creating or revamping 
programs that engage students in real legal work.”133 With this goal in mind, the 
authors carefully explore the possible variations among structures in terms of “a ‘why, 
what, who, where, when, and how’  framework.”134 This careful categorization is 
indeed illuminating, but the authors do not intend to offer just an abstract analysis. 
They present their typology in multiple formats, no doubt meant to make their 
framework usable by actual law school faculties making actual curricular decisions.135 
They also discuss the “contexts and constraints” that will affect actual choices among 
these options,136 and illustrate how such decisionmaking can proceed by offering a 
series of carefully elaborated examples.137
 What choices will such decisionmaking lead us to? The authors are well aware 
that law schools are under pressure “to find approaches [to experiential education] 
that can be scaled up to serve an entire student body at a cost that is not prohibitive.”138 
They do not question this goal, and their typology plainly includes both high-
supervision, high-cost approaches and others that are cheaper and involve less input 
from law school faculty. They themselves maintain, however, that “[t]he approach set 
out in this article does not support the argument” for skills teaching essentially 
131. See Project Based Learning Courses 2011–2012, New York Law School, http://www.nyls.edu/academics/
project_based_learning_courses/2011-2012_course_list (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
132. Maranville et al., supra note 121, at 526.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 527.
135. Id. at 526–36.
136. Id. at 536–46.
137. Id. at 546–58.
138. Id. at 556.
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divorced from the main work of the law school.139 Their own view is that while “even 
lightly supervised experiences can be valuable for targeted purposes,” for more 
fundamental experiential education to take place “a more systematic and intentional 
approach is required.”140 Ultimately, they call for building on, rather than departing 
from, the strengths of today’s clinical faculties:
Though we favor dispensing with orthodoxies and taking a broad view of the 
options for clinic design, we do so in the context of the extensive, deliberately 
developed programs taught by secure staff at each of our schools. We believe 
that thoughtfully designed “hybrid” opportunities are more likely to emerge 
at law schools with full-time, secure status, real case experiential faculty.141
 Laurie Morin and Susan Waysdorf offer an example of exactly this: a “hybrid” 
opportunity taking shape at a school with a particularly strong and established 
in-house clinical program, the University of the District of Columbia David A. 
Clarke School of Law, where they teach. Their essay, The Service-Learning Model in 
the Law School Curriculum: Expanding Opportunities for the Ethical-Social 
Apprenticeship,142 demonstrates that the “service-learning model” they identify is 
much more than an add-on, for it opens up pedagogical possibilities that other law 
school courses, including live-client clinics, may not be able to offer. It may indeed 
offer an especially powerful approach to the “third apprenticeship” identified in the 
Carnegie Report, the “ethical-social apprenticeship.”143
 Their course, Katrina and Beyond: Disaster Prevention and Recovery, Social Justice 
and Government Accountability, is “a doctrinal course with a service-learning 
component.”144 “Service-learning,” as the authors explain, is “a form of experiential 
education in which students engage in activities that address human and community 
needs together with structured opportunities intentionally designed to promote student 
learning and development. Reflection and reciprocity are key concepts of service-
learning.”145 While most clinics likely could fit within the terms of this definition, 
Morin and Waysdorf show us that service learning can be something new.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 557–58.
142. Laurie Morin & Susan Waysdorf, The Service-Learning Model in the Law School Curriculum: Expanding 
Opportunities for the Ethical-Social Apprenticeship, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 561 (2011–12). The authors 
describe their school’s extensive clinical program. Id. at 573–74 n.58.
143. Id. at 567; Carnegie Report, supra note 124, at 29. In what is already a widely followed formulation, 
the Carnegie Report frames the tasks of law school as involving three apprenticeships: the “intellectual 
or cognitive” apprenticeship (in legal reasoning); the “expert practice” or skills apprenticeship (naturally, 
a central focus of much “skills” education); and “the apprenticeship of identity and purpose,” which 
“introduces students to the purposes and attitudes that are guided by the values for which the professional 
community is responsible.” Carnegie Report, supra note 124. 
144. Morin & Waysdorf, supra note 142, at 563.
145. Id. at 564 n.9 (quoting Barbara Jacoby & Assoc., Service Learning in Higher Education: 
Concepts and Practices 5 (1996)).
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 Morin and Waysdorf did not quite set out to create a service-learning course. In 
a passage characteristic of clinical scholarship’s thoughtful self-reflection, they write 
that “[d]uring the process of four years of planning, evaluating, and revising the 
course, we have come to realize that our model is a ‘service-learning’ paradigm—an 
approach to apprenticeship that is widely accepted in other academic disciplines.”146 
Their initial reasons for choosing to develop the program they did, in which the 
experiential component is a one-credit practicum linked to a doctrinal course, were 
partly practical. A one-credit practicum would entail relatively limited time demands 
for faculty, and it would be correspondingly easier to offer the course to larger 
numbers of students than would be possible with a clinic. In addition, the authors 
“wanted to expand the focus of our legal service mission to encompass a national (or 
even global) community.”147 The authors also wanted to work on issues that might 
capture their students’ imaginations; a striking feature of Morin and Waysdorf ’s 
piece is their attention to the different priorities that members of the current, 
“millennial” generation and their “baby boom” professors may have.148
 As part of the course, Morin and Waysdorf provided for a one-credit “service 
week” in the New Orleans area.
Soon it became apparent that rather than being a practicum add-on, the 
service week was the central focus of the course. . . . [W]e struggled to catch 
up, to understand why the service week had played such a transformative role, 
not only for the students but for the faculty as well.149
Part of what they found in the first year was that a completely non-legal part of the 
service week, participation in “rebuild[ing] a family’s home that had been destroyed 
by Hurricane Katrina,” was for the students who engaged in it “the highlight of their 
week.” This recognition, “more than any other single factor, led us to understand that 
humanitarian-based service should become a more central component of the course 
over the next three years.”150 Over time, the authors came to structure the rest of the 
course to make the service-learning experience as profound as possible.151 As they 
observe earlier in the article, “[t]ypically, service-learning combines education with 
hands-on social action, and merges volunteering with a learning component.”152
 What they concluded is that “service-learning provides the most effective vehicle 
for the ‘third apprenticeship.’”153 “Optimally,” Morin and Waysdorf write, “service-
146. Id. at 565.
147. Id. at 574.
148. See id. at 575–89.
149. Id. at 597.
150. Id. at 598.
151. Id. at 599–600. Morin and Waysdorf discuss a number of the steps they developed in a section titled 
“Lessons Learned: Structuring a Service-Learning Experience for Millennial Law Students.” Id. at 
608–15.
152. Id. at 590.
153. Id.
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learning can be seen as a capstone experience for law students who have had the 
benefit of clinical courses, as well as doctrinal and externship courses.”154 What does 
service-learning add to the impact of the other courses?
Students described a deeper manner and type of learning than what they 
experienced in the doctrinal lecture classes and even in the close supervision 
of the often tightly managed clinical programs and case work. While students 
had often achieved positive results for their clients in traditional clinics, 
students reported that the client impact in the service-learning context felt 
more immediate and powerful.155
 The role of the teacher also shifted. “We began,” say Morin and Waysdorf, “to 
intentionally view ourselves more as facilitators and senior collaborators, than as 
clinical supervisors, externship advisors, or, certainly, classroom lecturers.”156 So, 
correspondingly, the learning process shifted as well. The authors quote a student’s 
ref lections, from which they draw the conclusion that “role-modeling and the 
importance of normative and iconic values such as comradeship, collegiality, 
leadership, collaboration, and sacrifice for the greater good are tangible fruits of 
service-learning.”157 Put more generally, “the dual principles of ref lection and 
reciprocity between the server and the person or group being served are the 
touchstones of the service-learning paradigm.”158 And while service-learning “can 
include client work,” it “does not have to be client-based.”159 For law schools, in short, 
service-learning may be something new under the sun.
 Professor Brook Baker offers a more radical, though also somewhat hesitant, 
challenge to conventional law school skills education in his essay, Practice-Based 
Learning: Emphasizing Practice and Offering Critical Perspectives on the Dangers of 
“Co-Op”tation.160 The “co-ops” in the word “‘co-op’tation” are the four full-time work 
experiences that Northeastern University School of Law, where Baker teaches, 
requires from all students as an integral part of their law school years. As we will see, 
Baker firmly maintains that students can learn a great deal from these work 
experiences, without the need for intervention by law school faculty, but he is 
concerned that what they learn may not always be what they should.
 Baker lays out the case for the value of work—work unmediated by faculty 
supervision or commentary—in plain terms: “My purpose in this article is to present a 
strong thesis—that practice is the primary site of legal learning and that it should be 
154. Id. at 604.
155. Id. at 602.
156. Id. at 601.
157. Id. at 606.
158. Id. at 591.
159. Id. at 593.
160. Brook K. Baker, Practice-Based Learning: Emphasizing Practice and Offering Critical Perspectives on the 
Dangers of “Co-Op”tation, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 619 (2011–12).
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recognized and valued as such.”161 This proposition may startle many clinical readers. 
Few of them, however, will quarrel with Baker for his critique of “classroom pedagogy.” 
Baker argues, in part, that classroom pedagogy is “ploddingly textual and logical, 
emphasizing the primacy of conscious thought and abstract legal doctrine,” while 
cognition properly understood “springs forth from multiple subconscious wells; it is 
certainly more spontaneous than planned.”162 He embraces, instead, “[c]ontextualist 
cognition,” which “recognizes the synergies of functional engagement, of being 
deeply involved in a real or virtually real activity.”163 Baker contends that classroom 
pedagogy also misses the mark by exaggerating the role of the teacher and missing 
the educational significance of the student’s placement in “a field of practice,”164 and 
by presuming that “learning is lonely” and individual rather than a process that takes 
place within “the elaborate web of interpersonal relationships that compose the 
workplace.”165
 So far so good. Clinicians will also have no trouble agreeing with Baker’s 
argument that practice is an essential teacher—after all, that proposition is integral 
to clinical course design. Nor is it actually startling that Baker maintains that 
students can and do learn from practice without the presence of faculty instructors. 
Put as I just did, this proposition is one that ultimately cannot be denied; otherwise, 
we would be saying that law students’ learning about their profession ends when they 
leave their last law school clinic.
 But what is startling is the extent to which Baker questions whether skills teachers 
add greatly to what students learn from practice itself. To be sure, Baker never 
questions that clinics are valuable sites of practice learning. He maintains that “it is 
nonetheless crucial to examine the evolution of practice-based competence since so 
many university students work with practitioners who are not educational specialists 
on co-ops, in internships, in community service-learning, and in clinical 
placements.”166 How do students learn from these settings, which include but are 
clearly not limited to those that entail direct faculty engagement? Baker answers:
In exploring the cognitive and performative foundations of competence, what 
might be called ecological skills, four points are worth emphasizing: (1) 
learning disciplinary skills is more a matter of enculturation than of cognitive 
development; thus contextualizing learning in the workplace permits both a 
cognitive apprenticeship and a life-long perspective on work as a learning 
opportunity; (2) recognizing skills to be relational, interactive and contingent 
permits us to focus more on the entire social network than on any single 
strand of relationships; (3) learning in the workplace helps develop situation-
assessment skills as well as performance and transfer skills; and (4) learning 
161. Id. at 620.
162. Id. at 622.
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 623.
165. Id. at 624.
166. Id. at 628.
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in the workplace promotes confrontation of ineffective heuristics and their 
replacement with genuine understandings.167
All of these considerations support learning in clinics, but Baker’s point is that they 
support learning outside of clinics, on the job, as well. In some respects, moreover, 
these factors may suggest that more can be learned on the job than in the clinic, 
because jobs are even more real than clinics. If, for instance, what is to be learned is 
“enculturation,”168 the culture of lawyering is primarily outside the walls of law 
schools.
 But it might be that practice teaches all too well. Baker doubts the force of 
critiques of learning-from-work that assert that students in legal jobs will not receive 
meaningful assignments or adequate supervision.169 He also argues that “the fear that 
students will be seduced by bad [that is, substandard] practice seems somewhat 
exaggerated.”170 He is concerned, however, by the possibility that “students are 
routinely exposed to unethical or immoral practice,” and that the result may be “a 
lessening of students’ moral standards—a socialization to degraded norms of 
practice—and a profound sense of disillusionment.”171
 What is to be done about this? One important answer that clinical teachers have 
given is that students need to learn to reflect on their experiences. Precisely because 
law school skills teaching is done by professional teachers, and often in situations 
where practice is deliberately slowed down to allow time for analysis, law school is 
the place where the practice of reflection is inculcated. Baker raises questions about 
the centrality of conscious reflection—in part because so much of cognition, as he 
has already argued, is not a matter of consciously formulated propositions and 
reasons.172 But he ultimately agrees that it is a happy fact that “people are capable of 
criticizing their culture.”173 “[I]n order to reduce the dangers of ‘co-op’tation,” he 
writes, “we should encourage our students to maintain a critical perspective on their 
process of acculturation, before, during, and after their practice-based experiences.”174 
What is the role of law schools in this encouraging? Baker raises a series of questions 
about how law schools might best promote critique, and observes that “[t]his range of 
questions does not cause me to question the desirability of critique, social action, and 
167. Id. at 628. Baker develops each of these points in detail. Id. at 628–39.
168. Id. at 639. Brooks and Madden also emphasize the understanding of professional education as socialization 
or acculturation. Brooks & Madden, supra note 44, at 338.
169. Baker, supra note 160, at 642–46 (discussing work assignments and quality of supervision, respectively).
170. Id. at 643.
171. Id. at 644 (discussing Lawrence K. Hellman, The Effect of Law Office Work on the Formation of Law 
Students’ Professional Values: Observation, Explanation, Optimization, 4 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 537 
(1991)).
172. Id. at 650–51.
173. Id. at 651.
174. Id. at 657.
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reform, but merely reminds me that we have only tentative theory or data that reliably 
predicts where critique can most meaningfully occur.”175
 In the end, therefore, Baker both widens the range of sources of practice education 
and highlights how complicated the analysis and improvement of these multiple 
domains may be. As he writes, “[t]he relation between the legal classroom and law 
practice is not simply hierarchical, one being more important than the other; the 
relationship might partly be one of two worlds apart and in other respects it might be 
collaborative, interactive, synergistic, or mutually constitutive.”176 Only further work 
will tell.
iii. thE rOLE Of rEsEarCh
 All of the articles in this issue reflect both how much we have learned, and how 
much is still to be discovered. Several emphasize the need for research—to assess the 
value of particular forms of law practice, for example, or to understand better how 
students learn and how we as law teachers can assist that process. Professor Katherine 
Kruse’s article, Getting Real About Legal Realism, New Legal Realism, and Clinical 
Legal Education, focuses particularly closely on the role that law clinics might play in 
better understanding the legal system and so knowing better what to teach our 
students.177
 Professor Kruse reminds us that “[o]ne of the earliest calls for clinical legal 
education came from the American Legal Realist movement of the 1920s and 1930s, 
in Jerome Frank’s plea for the creation of clinical lawyer-schools.”178 Legal realism, as 
she also reminds us, was deeply concerned with the “distinction between the law in 
books and the law in action.”179 Aren’t clinics necessarily concerned with this same 
distinction? In one sense, the answer is surely yes: as I commented earlier in this 
Introduction, every skills teacher aims, at least in part, to help law students become 
effective lawyers, and effectiveness is impossible without a full sense of how the law 
in action functions. And yet, Kruse argues, “there has been relatively little analysis of 
how clinics might be consciously designed around exposing students to gaps between 
the law in books and the law in action.” Moreover, “empirical scholarship in the legal 
175. Id. at 655. Brooks & Madden discuss Baker’s “ecological learning” theory, and suggest that what is 
missing “is a normative theoretical grounding that can inform and guide students in connection with 
their work experiences.” Brooks & Madden, supra note 44, at 356. They suggest that the concepts of 
relationship-centered lawyering provide this grounding. Id. More generally, we might say that one way 
to encourage such critical thinking is to make sure students have the perspective with which to really 
understand the dilemmas of practice. 
176. Baker, supra note 160, at 656.
177. Katherine R. Kruse, Getting Real About Legal Realism, New Legal Realism, and Clinical Legal Education, 
56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 659 (2011–12). Full disclosure: I am pleased to say that Professor Kruse and I 
were two of the five authors of a book on legal interviewing and counseling. See Ellmann, Dinerstein, 
Gunning, Kruse & Shalleck, supra note 36.
178. Kruse, supra note 177, at 660 (emphasis added).
179. Id. (emphasis added).
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realist tradition,” which does explore these gaps, “often fails to connect its behavioral 
insights to the tasks of legal representation.”180
 Kruse thoughtfully traces the roots of this separation of two strands of law school 
effort that seem to share a common focus. Jerome Frank himself was so profoundly 
convinced of the idiosyncratic character of trial courts’ work, she urges, that it would 
have been hard to find in his approach “a structure for helping students generalize 
from and transfer the knowledge gained from exposure to practice in his clinical 
lawyer-school to their experience as lawyers in the future.”181 Meanwhile, other legal 
realists remained too subject to “the dominance of appellate case law” as a focus of 
attention,182 or embraced a form of social science explanation so Olympian that it 
“fail[ed] to capture the way that judges and lawyers look at law in making legal 
arguments and decisions.”183 The practical energy of the movement, it seems, was 
largely channeled into curricular reforms such as the creation of courses built around 
a social problem (for instance, “family law”) rather than a doctrinal area—not a trivial 
development, but well short of the establishment of a skills curriculum.184
 Kruse believes, however, that today these two strands of attention to the actual 
life of the law can converge, because each has now developed beyond its earlier roots. 
On the one hand, Kruse emphasizes the rise of the “new legal realism.” This 
movement, she writes,
remains committed to the basic premise that a full study of the law must 
occur from the “bottom up,” defined as a focus on “the impact of law on 
ordinary people’s lives” as well as a sensitivity to the fact that “less powerful 
persons in society are often more invisible and silenced.”185
Moreover, she says, “[t]he New Legal Realists’ proposed ‘path between idealism and 
skepticism’ is paved by pragmatist methods of engaged, embedded or experimental 
research with its genesis in real-world problem-solving.”186
 On the other hand, as Kruse observes, these “tenets of the New Legal Realism . . . 
fit closely with the goals and methods of clinical legal education.”187 “An increasingly 
professionalized corps of clinicians has developed a more sophisticated pedagogy of 
clinical instruction that integrates theory and practice and helps students generalize 
from their clinic casework to larger issues of law, lawyering, and social justice,”188 and 
what the new legal realist research discovers, today’s clinicians are likely to want to 
180. Id. at 661.
181. Id. at 665, 667–68.
182. Id. at 669–70.
183. Id. at 671.
184. Id. at 672–76.
185. Id. at 680 (quoting Howard Erlanger, et al., Forward: Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 Wis. L. 
Rev. 335, 339–41 (2005)).
186. Id. at 681.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 676.
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teach. Clinics, after all, simply are concerned with the actual workings of the law.189 
Moreover, clinics aspire to teach both about how to handle individual cases and 
about how the system of which those cases are a part functions. New legal realist 
research “can help [clinicians] focus questions, introduce readings, and structure 
analysis that will assist students in making the connections between individual 
advocacy and systemic or social justice reform . . . .”190
 Moreover, what the new legal realists want to discover, clinicians are poised to 
illuminate. “[C]linicians,” as Kruse writes, “regularly engage the elusive ‘bottom-up’ 
perspective of those with less power in society that the new legal realist scholars 
hope to capture in their redefined ‘law and society’ research.”191 Pursuing such 
insights may come more readily to clinicians today, in addition, if Kruse is right that 
“[w]ith an increasing number of clinical faculty members in tenure-track positions 
under the same or substantially similar expectations for scholarship as their non-
clinical colleagues, clinician-scholars have increasingly turned their attention” to 
scholarship that goes beyond their longstanding work in “clinic teaching, clinic 
design, and lawyering.”192 This observation captures a critical development in the 
world of skills teaching, a development reflected in this volume as a whole and also 
in the Clinical Theory Workshop over the years—the rise, and diversification, of 
scholarship as part of the role of many skills professors.
 And yet it seems fair to say that not much of this research has yet been done by 
clinicians. Why not? Undoubtedly part of the reason is that good social science 
research is as difficult as any other task to perform well—and requires its own special 
expertise. It is no small matter to find time and acquire expertise, and at some 
institutions the sheer unconventionality of this work may give clinicians further 
reason to hesitate.193 But Kruse also suspects that “institutional and psychological 
boundaries . . . separate” clinicians and new legal realist researchers from each other, 
and she urges both sides to overcome these difficulties and develop “collaboration, 
mutual exploration and experimentation.”194
 Perhaps it is not out of place to add another reason why this convergence would 
be so welcome: it is necessary. We cannot actually know what to teach our students 
unless we understand how the legal system works. Equally, we cannot know what 
methods of teaching do help our students learn without studying that question.195 
And we cannot satisfy our students, our accreditors, or ourselves that we are actually 
189. Id. at 681–82.
190. Id. at 682.
191. Id. at 683.
192. Id. at 676.
193. Id. at 683.
194. Id. at 684.
195. Cf. Mansfield & Trubek, supra note 56, at 386 (calling for clinics to be “‘laboratories,’ in which new 
models of lawyers can be explored and analyzed”). 
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providing the education we should unless we can acquire this knowledge. There is, 
as I have already said, a great deal to be done.
iV. CLOsing thOUghts
 If we have a lot to learn, however, it is because we have already learned a great 
deal. Clinical scholarship, exemplified by the twelve pieces in this issue, is serious, 
insightful, critical work. It is anything but abstract, or a diversion from the work of 
cases and teaching; instead, it is, again and again, a part of clinicians’ and skills 
teachers’ ongoing, collective effort to improve our contribution to preparing the 
lawyers of the country and the world.
 Brook Baker reminds us that cognition is a social practice, and certainly that is 
true of scholarship as well. If we want to read, and write, clinical scholarship, we 
need a community of clinical scholars. That community has come together in many 
different venues—in the pages of the Clinical Law Review and other journals 
(including this one); in the many scholarship meetings held at annual clinical 
conferences; in the pathbreaking conferences held by UCLA and their British 
co-sponsors; and in several regional workshops of clinical scholars. All of these have 
been important—and I hope it is not immodest to say that the Clinical Theory 
Workshops have been important too.
 The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Conference included a dinner session, at which I 
endured both gentle teasing and generous praise. I am very grateful to everyone who 
was part of that dinner or of any aspect of the conference.196 But I cannot end without 
speaking of the song that Bob Dinerstein wrote, and he and others performed.197 
Anyone who has heard Bob’s songs of course dreams of being the subject of one, and 
in that respect my life is now complete. But I take the central lyric of his song, 
slightly rephrased, as really being about the work and fun that all of us who’ve been 
part of the Clinical Theory Workshop have had over the years. Or, in other words:
Don’t say nothin’ bad about our workshop!
196. A range of New York Law School administration and staff members contributed to the tasks of 
organizing this conference, including Harry Althaus, Jessica Aviles, Marvin Bustamante, Regina 
Chung, Steven Cunningham, Adam Cohen, Mike DeMeo, Charles Engelberg, Ray Grant, Nancy 
Guida, George Hayes, Ted Hicks, Amelia Jonakait, Usheevii King, Karen Kolyer, Odilka Santiago, 
Tyler Sidell, John Southard, Lillian Valle-Santiago, Kathy Wong, and especially Claire Voulgarelis. 
Many thanks to all of them, and to the members of the New York Law School Law Review.
197. Robert D. Dinerstein, Don’t Say Nothin’ Bad About My Workshop (2010), adapted from The Cookies, 
Don’t Say Nothin’ Bad (About My Baby) (1963) (performing an original work by Gerry Goffin and Carole 
King), and premiered by Bob Dinerstein with Jenny Lyman, Jean Koh Peters and Ann Shalleck on Oct. 
1, 2010.
